"Back at the Gap" Major General Frank H. Smoker, Jr. (USAF, Retired) Pentagon sets sights on Gap’s U.S. Army components Article # 33 in a series In 1988, Fort Indiantown Gap was chosen to host Operation Golden Thrust 88, the largest peacetime mobilization exercise since WWII. Approximately 4,000 Army Reserve and National Guard troops from 16 units converged on the Gap to participate in the major exercise to test the mobilization process. This First US Army exercise involved a 12-state region of mid-Atlantic and New England states. At that time, FtIG is one of 12 mobilization stations in the region. The total exercise involved about 24,000 troops from 115 reserve component units. According to Major Joel Sloss, a FTIG mobilization planner, OGT88 gave mobilization planners a chance to see if mobilization plans were valid. OGT88 was designed to test the accuracy and readiness of mobilization plans, policies and procedures as well as the administrative and logistical supporting systems of Reserve and National Guard units. The exercise required units to undergo several administrative procedures to ensure that personnel and equipment were prepared in the event of mobilization. The primary mission of FTIG personnel during a mobilization, Sloss said, is to "determine if individual soldiers, units and equipment are ready to deploy to a theater of operations”. Units were to complete their two-weeks annual training at FTIG but no units or equipment would deploy overseas. If a soldier or unit did not meet minimum standards for deployment, then the Gap's various directorates would try to provide equipment, training and personnel services to bring them up to acceptable standards. The Regional Medical Training Site at Fort Indiantown Gap, dedicated on November 6, 1989, was organized to train medical units in the use the Army's new portable field hospital equipment. In December of 1989, the 303rd Field Hospital from St. Louis, Missouri was sent to the Gap and became the first unit in the nation to use this portable equipment in a cold weather environment. In the Fall of 1990, Fort Indiantown Gap began mobilizing Reserve Component units which had been called up for Operation Desert Shield. During that operation and subsequent operation Desert Storm, approximately 2,500 soldiers from 15 Army National Guard and Army Reserve units were deployed from FTIG. The Gap’s U. S. Army garrison conducted personnel and finance processing and provided logistical and administrative support for the units, while the Readiness Group-FTIG conducted intensive training in military skills. During the demobilization phase, the installation processed 27 Reserve Component units for return to their home stations. Action by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) in 1991 and later in 1995 was to irrevocably change the history of Fort Indiantown Gap. The Garrison staff first learned of this most recent proposal to close Fort Indiantown Gap when a Harrisburg radio station called the Public Affairs office at 11:30 am on May 31, 1991 asking for an official reaction to an Associated Press story announcing the news. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC), a group of civilians appointed by the President and Congress to study installations of all branches of the military and make recommendations to President Bush, had just added 36 installations to a list submitted by the Department of Defense. The Gap was one of the additions and this news was to have been announced at a press conference that day. However, the Associated Press ran the story several hours prior to the scheduled news conference. Fort Indiantown Gap, Ft. McCoy, WI, Ft. A. P. Hill, VA, Ft. Buchanan, Puerto Rico, and Camp Picket, VA, were all added to the list to study the feasibility of transferring the posts to the Army's reserve components. In the case of Indiantown Gap, that would mean the Pennsylvania National Guard, which originally established Indiantown Gap as a training area in the 1930's, was subject to realignment or closure. "I have said all along that we won't rubber-stamp the Defense Secretary's proposals." BRAC chairman Jim Courter said in a press release announcing the additions. "And I have cautioned everyone not to assume that their installation is safe just because it is not included in the Pentagon's report." The commission's list was announced shortly after a U.S. Representative from New Jersey, Jim Saxton, testified to BRAC that Ft. Indiantown Gap and Ft. A. P. Hill were "old fashioned, World War II-era bases that have limited military value." Saxton's district covered Ft. Dix, which the Pentagon slated for closure. The announcement that the Gap would be considered for realignment set off a flurry of activity locally. With the demobilization of Desert Storm troops and equipment still underway, local officials prepared to make their case that the U.S. Army Garrison should remain in charge of the Gap. On June 17, Major General Gerald T. Sajer, the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania; U.S. Senator Harris Wofford, who had been appointed to fill the remainder of the term of the late Senator John Heinz; U.S. Representatives George Gekas and Robert Walker; state Senator David Brightbill; myself, former Air Guard Commander; and Lebanon County Commissioner William Carpenter all traveled to Washington and presented testimony to BRAC in support of maintaining the Garrison at the Gap. Key points during the testimony included the fact that the Army studied the possibility of turning the Post over to the National Guard several times in the past, most recently in 1986. Each time, it was conclusively proved that such a move would not result in cost savings. I pointed out that many functions currently performed by the Garrison would still have to be performed by the Guard, so the costs to the government would remain constant. Congressman Walker told the panel that the average cost to train a soldier at Fort Indiantown Gap was only about $186 per year. He also pointed out that Pennsylvania had already been hard-hit by the drawdowns with five military installations in the state already targeted for closure. General Sajer briefed the Commission on the wide variety of training conducted at the Gap, the facilities available on Post, and the capabilities and limitations for training and mobilization. He also stressed that Fort Indiantown Gap was a “no frills” Post, with adequate training facilities but no extra amenities. Much of my testimony concerned the location of the Post. I pointed out how much training time Reserve Component soldiers would lose if they had to travel farther from their home stations for weekend and annual training. I stressed the tremendous military value of the Post and noted that since Harrisburg is a rail and highway hub, and since the Gap is close to all of the major northeastern seaports, it is in an ideal location for shipping troops and materiel during mobilization. U.S. Senator Arlen Specter conducted a tour of the Post on June 25. Afterwards, he sent a memorandum to BRAC summarizing the findings of his tour. The senator said, "I don't want to see us weaken our national defense posture with unwise cuts. The Gap has proven itself time and again." The testimony of those mentioned apparently was persuasive because the Commission voted to delete Fort Indiantown Gap from its list of bases to be realigned when it made its final recommendation on June 30. As federal employees and area politicians breathed sighs of relief, some were thinking about the next time. As we flew back to Lebanon, I was quoted as saying, "We can't rest on our laurels. It'll probably come up again." These were prophetic words because the Gap’s garrison was again placed on the BRAC list in 1995. Published in the Wednesday edition of the Lebanon Daily News February 9, 2005 © 2005 Frank H. Smoker, Jr. All rights reserved. Reproduced by permission of the author. Go "Back at the Gap" Index