"Back at the Gap" Major General Frank H. Smoker, Jr. (USAF, Retired) Gap shows up on BRACC hit list from 1991 - 95 36th in a series In 1991, my concern of the Gap being considered for base closure became a reality when the Base Realignment and Closure Commission placed Fort Indiantown Gap on its new Hit List. Then U.S. Representative. Robert Walker asked me and others, with only 10 days notice, to testify before the BRACC in Congress, and we were successful in having the facility removed from the closure list. In January 1993, we faced the same problem. This was a very important issue with a potential effect on everyone in the region. It was clear to me and others that were our installation closed, the result will have a tremendous economic impact upon our community. Assuming that all bases would be again reviewed, in November 1992 I started to get ready for the BRACC’s 1993 session. Fortunately, the Gap was not placed on the list in 1993. Again assuming we would be subject for review during the 1995 BRACC campaign, I began preparation for the defense of the Gap in July 1994 on behalf of the Military Affairs Committee of the Lebanon Valley Chamber of Commerce. Why this great concern? The quick answer was that Fort Indiantown Gap was (and still is) the largest employer in Lebanon County - with, at that time, over 2,200 military and civilian personnel employed, including regular U.S. Army, Army Reserve and Department of the Army civilians, Pennsylvania National Guard military and technician personnel, and 142 Commonwealth workers - all of which resulted in an annual payroll of over $68 million. An additional $68 million was spent by the various units at the Gap for operations and maintenance and for major and minor construction. Then there was the Guard and Reserve weekend training and annual training payroll of over $22 million. All this added up to a whopping $159 million federal dollars flowing into our local economy. Obviously, that got my attention. Although many of us were aware of this significance to our local economy, we could not use economic factor as our argument to keep the Gap open, because everyone knows any base closure affects the local economy. The 1995 Department of Defense final selection criteria had eight main points. The first five dealt with military value; the other three related to that factor. So, military value was what we had to emphasize in our justification to the Pentagon and the BRACC. We had to emphasize the national defense importance of Fort Indiantown Gap and clearly demonstrate the economical manner in which the missions at the facility were being accomplished. We also had to emphasize the extremely valuable training missions being performed at the Gap; the contributions to combat readiness; the tremendous stability of the workforce; and the savings that would be derived within the defense budget by maintaining the Gap at its present level of activity -- maintaining the status quo. As expected, Fort Indiantown Gap was placed on the 1995 list for consideration for closure or realignment. The explanation of some of our testimony before the commission is of historical significance. It’s included in this history so our citizens of Lebanon County and our community leaders remain aware of just how important the Gap was (and, more than ever, still is) to our national defense. Because of my long tenure at Fort Indiantown Gap, the last seven years of which serving as the Commander of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, I felt that I had a good perspective as to the cost effective operations and important military values of Fort Indiantown Gap as a reserve training installation. I strongly believed that efficiency and cost effectiveness existing at the Gap provided a strong case to support the status quo. Mentioning status quo, I might explain what we were striving for. We knew the Gap would not be completely closed down because of the permanent National Guard units stationed there. However, we were concerned that the BRACC pull out the Regular Army and all of its civilian employees out of the Gap, and then have the National Guard operate the Post -- a realignment. We didn’t doubt that the National Guard could operate the Post. Rather, we realized this realignment would mean a potential loss of 768 positions, and an annual payroll loss of over $20 million. So, we were recommending status quo -- maintenance of the U. S. Army Garrison at Fort Indiantown Gap with no change in its present mission. Our belief was that realignment would not actually save manpower spaces or federal funds, since such a realignment would simply transfer of these resources from one federal appropriation (the U. S. Army) to another appropriation (the National Guard). Realistically, we contended that there was not a training installation within northeastern United States with all of the training facilities and unique features as then operated at Fort Indiantown Gap in such an efficient and economical manner. Because of the Fort's central location to the largest concentration of reserve component troops in northeastern United States -- closer than any other existing reserve training facility, the Gap served as a valuable training base where over 177,000 guard and reserve personnel trained during 1994, with considerable cost savings to the DOD budget and the taxpayers. The Gap's modern training facilities also contributed to its cost effectiveness. Located at the Gap were some unique and significant training functions, including an artillery range and a tank firing range, with sufficient space for maneuver training for a full infantry brigade. The facility also included a tactical air to ground range, one of only 15 such ranges in the U. S., with the ability to allow strafing of 20 and 30 mm ammunition and rockets and dropping practice bombs. The range also included a Military Operating Airspace, a crucial designated airspace that took nearly five years to develop after complex negotiations between the Federal Aviation Administration, the Air Force, and the Air National Guard. There are only a very few such exclusive military airspaces available within the United States, so this MOA in Pennsylvania is especially valuable. My next column will describe our presentation for keeping the Gap open to the 1995 BRACC and how our actions resulted in the favorable decision to allow transition of the Fort into a National Guard Training Center. CORRECTION: in Article #28, “Thousands of Cuban refugees arrive at Gap”, published December 1, I incorrectly stated that the Task Force Commander Brigadier General Grail L. Brookshire “unfortunately died of cancer shortly after his tour of duty at the Gap”. General Brookshire’s son Alan discovered this error and informed me last week that his father was alive and well. I have since heard from General Brookshire and I am happy to report he informed me he is not only alive and well but he is living in Tennessee and enjoying his retirement. My original statement was obviously based upon erroneous information and I apologize for this error. Published in the Wednesday, March 23, 2005, edition of the Lebanon Daily News © 2005 Frank H. Smoker, Jr. All rights reserved. Reproduced by permission of the author. Go "Back at the Gap" Index