"Back at the Gap" Major General Frank H. Smoker, Jr. (USAF, Retired) Supporters proved Gap was worth saving 39th in a series In the aftermath of the BRAC 1995 decision to, as the commission put it, “Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except essential ranges, training facilities, and training areas, as a reserve component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training.” it is an important part of the Gap’s history to record the events and actions accomplished by the Lebanon Valley Chamber, the National Guard and others that led to this favorable decision to save the Gap as a training site. Much credit goes to those who were supportive in our quest to save Fort Indiantown Gap from closure. When we were preparing our presentation, in addition to the outstanding work of our two consultants, General Roger Bultman and Jon Kent, we received great support from our representatives in government, including U.S. Sen. Rick Santorum, Congressmen George Gekas and Tim Holden (and their respective chiefs of staff, Allan Cagnoli and William Hanley), State Sen. David Brightbill, and County Commissioners Bill Carpenter and Rose Marie Swanger. Stephan Vegoe, president of the Lebanon Valley Chamber of Commerce, was the driving force behind the entire operation. His ideas, energy and enthusiasm permeated all aspects of our program. Others from the chamber’s Military Affairs Committee included the chairman, Colonel Donald Snyder, and myself. At the Gap, Adjutant General Gerald Sajer was actively involved, as was the leader of the Military Affairs Crisis Action Team, Lt. Col. Joseph Laneski. Colonel Robert Witmer added his considerable expertise to the team. Also, many of the Gap workers contributed their services. Immediately upon his retirement, former Army Garrison Commander Lt. Col. David Cook, was hired by the Chamber and provided extremely valuable coordination to the Crisis Team. The Army’s study had omitted many factors that would have contributed to the Fort’s military value. However, Capt. Tony Gulotta, our expert staff auditor, prepared a cost analysis which refuted the Army’s estimated cost savings of $23 million when in fact the actual annual cost was only $10.5 million. Gulotta’s discovery contributed in great measure in the defense for keeping the Gap. Using this crucial point, in conjunction with our presentation of other important factors such as equipment, ranges, facilities, schools, and training performed at the Gap, allowed us to convincingly demonstrate the Gap’s extremely high degree of military value. All of the individuals mentioned and many others behind the scene formed a team without equal. Indeed, our team effort paid off because we were successful in convincing the BRAC Commissioners to recommend that Fort Indiantown Gap remain as a training site. This BRAC decision was the beginning of a new era for Fort Indiantown Gap. With the change in landlords, the U.S. Army Garrison was scheduled to be inactivated by September 30, 1998, and the Fort would become a National Guard Training Site on October 1, 1998. During the ensuing three years, implementation of the 1995 BRAC action resulted in some serious unknowns, especially in regard to the federal employees working there. While the post would remain open and continue training National Guard and reserve personnel, the number of people who had been running the base and the amount of federal funding available to operate it would be reduced. While there was this uncertainty as to who would remain employed at the Gap, there was still the need to continue to perform the mission. Records indicate by October 1995, 248 permanent, full-time civilians were on the federal payroll operating the Gap, but that number was expected to drop to 235 employees by January 1997. National Guard estimates were that by October 1988, about 80 to 100 civilians would still be on board to run the post. The situation was even more complicated since federal civilian employees scheduled to lose their jobs could apply for state positions, but unfortunately, those who would be hired by the state would lose their federal seniority. As the federal garrison office manager Nancy McNamara said at the time, “Everyone is on pins and needles.” McNamara predicted that by April 1998, federal employees who run the post would be in the minority, and there would be a transition when the Army scales down and the Guard scales up. On a more positive note, federal employees who would lose their jobs would be eligible for early retirement and early-retirements incentives of up to $25,000 in lump sum payments. Federal employees would also receive job replacement and educational training. Lt. Col. Joseph Laneski, DMA transition leader, was slated to become the National Guard post commander on October 1, 1998. He indicated that the state-owned Gap would continue to be leased by the federal government until 2049 and would continue to receive federal funds. At the time, he said that his task was to sell the Gap as a good place for 175,000 or so reservists to train each year. “We’re still open,” he said. “We’re simply transferring management.” Indeed, Fort Indiantown Gap remained a full-service training installation. During the transition process, to the credit of all employees, the Gap continued to be a hub for reserve component training, providing service to over 177,000 students and other training customers annually. The primary reasons for this high use were the location close to hundreds of Guard units and Reserve units, the variety and quality of weapons ranges, mortar and artillery firing points, as well as the air-to-ground bombing and strafing range. Other continuing services included the Troop Medical Clinic, operating on a seven day, 12 hour shift basis; quality of life activities such as the gymnasium, swimming pool, bowling center and Community Club, Post Exchange, gas station and shopette and military clothing sales store; Muir Army Airfield and the Army Aviation Support facility, which encompasses a 3,600 foot runway and an air traffic control service; professional education centers supporting both military and civilian training needs; and command and control of the Pennsylvania Army and Air National Guard, logistics and maintenance support functions, and direction of veterans’ affairs for the Commonwealth. Based on the level of day-to-day activity, the installation was, and continues to be, more than a weekend training site. Its infrastructure is critical to sustain those activities which operate on a continuous basis, supporting not only the Pennsylvania National Guard but also Guard and Reserve members from across the nation who train there. With an average daily population about 1,500, Fort Indiantown Gap is a robust training installation. The land, facilities, training opportunities and location are irreplaceable in the scheme of reserve component training. During the transition process, House Bill 1561 was signed into law by Governor Tom Ridge on May 7, 1998. This critical legislation permits the Adjutant General and the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs to enter into cooperative agreements with the federal government; establish Fort Indiantown Gap as a primary training site for the Pennsylvania National Guard; purchase, lease or obtain land for military training; establish a special revenue fund for morale, morale and welfare; and operate facilities and organize activities for morale and welfare. Published in the Wednesday, May 4, 2005 edition of the Lebanon Daily News © 2005 Frank H. Smoker, Jr. All rights reserved. Reproduced by permission of the author. Go "Back at the Gap" Index